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- ART. IX. — 1. *Speech of the HON. LEWIS CASS in the United States Senate, January 28, 1856, on Central American Affairs and the Monroe Doctrine.*
2. *Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London, comprising Incidents Official and Personal, from 1819 to 1825. Including Negotiations on the Oregon Question, and other unsettled Questions between the United States and Great Britain.* By RICHARD RUSH, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States, from 1817 to 1825. Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard. 1845.
3. *The Political Life of the Right Honorable GEORGE CANNING, from his Acceptance of the Seals of the Foreign Department, in September, 1822, to the Period of his Death, in August, 1827.* By AUGUSTUS GRANVILLE STAPLETON, Esq. Three vols. London: Longman, Rees, & Co. 1831.
4. *Register of Debates in Congress, comprising the Leading Debates and Incidents of the First Session of the Nineteenth Congress: together with an Appendix, containing the most Important State Papers and Public Documents to which the Session has given Birth.* Washington: Gales and Seaton. 1826.
5. *The Parliamentary Debates.* New Series, Vol. X. Comprising the Period from the 3d day of February to the 29th day of March, 1824. Published under the Superintendence of T. C. HANSARD. London. 1824.

It is not wonderful that the political code of the Assyrian Empire should be involved in much obscurity, or that the municipal regulations of Nineveh should have received but little elucidation from the recent researches of a Layard and a Botta. That Thirlwall and Grote should find in the public polity of the Grecian states much that defies even their critical acumen, or that Niebuhr and Arnold should sometimes be puzzled (though the former never confesses it) by certain historical problems in Roman legislation, can surely afford no matter of just surprise, when we reflect upon the mists of antiquity which have gathered around the records of the ancients. But that in a modern country like these United States, not

yet a century old, in a country, too, where measures of state policy are subjects of popular appeal and revision, we should have our questions of political history as vexed and insolvable, to all appearance, as any in the ancient commonwealths, is not a little remarkable. Is it that, in the rapid succession of public events, they pass before the popular eye like a series of dissolving views before the gazers in some provincial theatre? Or is it that, in "the progress" of Young America, rejoicing like a strong man to run his race, he finds no time to look back upon each step in his career, and to note to-day the goal from which he started yesterday? Or is it that prejudice and party spirit distort our judgments and obscure our vision with regard to what is near, and thus engender among us the same misconceptions that are produced by the dubious twilight through which we view what is remote? However we may explain the fact, certain it is that not a few among the most important events recorded in our national annals are, at the present day, the subjects of grave and earnest controversy, waged not only in the arena of political debate, but on the field of historical review. One of these *questiones vexatæ* of American politics will occupy our attention in the present paper.

The "Monroe Doctrine," as it is called, has during the last few lustres of our political history loomed into a new prominence. Employed as a maxim to justify certain important measures of state policy, it has naturally become a theme for discussion among our statesmen, and for remark by the public press. And still more recently, in the negotiations between our government and that of England on Central American affairs, the "Doctrine" has been declared to be the policy of the present Executive of the United States. We therefore need no apology for bringing the whole subject to the attention of our readers.

The "Monroe Doctrine," as it is popularly designated, purports to be founded on certain declarations contained in the annual Message of President Monroe to the Congress which assembled in December, 1823. In that executive paper Mr. Monroe alludes to the progress of the negotiations then pending between our own government and that of Russia

respecting the boundary of our northwestern territory. After briefly stating the nature and extent of the conflicting claims advanced by the two countries, with regard to their respective possessions in that quarter, and while professing the hope that the controversy between them would find a satisfactory solution, the President takes occasion to add : —

“ In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements in which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.”

In the latter part of the same Message is also found another declaration, addressed to the European powers, and prompted, it would seem, by the unsettled condition of the late Spanish American colonies, whose independence had been already recognized by our government, though they were still in a state of nominal war with the mother country. This portion of the Message is conceived in the following terms : —

“ In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we *should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.* With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere ; but with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration

and on just principles, acknowledged, *we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.* In the war between those new governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition ; and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

“The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than *that the Allied Powers should have thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain.* To what extent *such* interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote ; and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same ; which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers ; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us ; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy ; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the Allied Powers should *extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness ;* nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.”

At the succeeding session, commencing December, 1824, President Monroe recurred to the subject in terms more brief, but not less emphatic. Speaking of the intestine divisions which had retarded the progress of the late Spanish American

colonies, after Spain had in fact ceased hostilities with them, he said :—

“Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European governments, nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its various vibrations, cannot affect us. It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every power, and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. But in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impossible for the European governments *to interfere in their concerns*, especially in those alluded to, which are vital, *without affecting us ; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us.* It is gratifying to know that some of the powers with whom we enjoy a very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them.”

These two declarations, sufficiently distinct from each other, though germane in their origin, as will appear in the course of this paper, have been not infrequently confounded together by the modern opponents of the “Monroe Doctrine,” who, in attempting to prove the temporary purpose of the doctrine itself, have sought to compass their object by a process of reasoning which applies only to the latter of its branches; while the advocates of the doctrine as now popularly known among us, in relying mainly upon the first-named declaration as containing the announcement of a permanent principle in American policy, have fallen into the still graver error of wholly misconceiving its original scope and significance as propounded by President Monroe. These assertions with regard to the intent and meaning of each head of the Monroe Doctrine, we shall endeavor to make good by a reference to historical facts and documentary papers contemporaneous with its promulgation, and avowedly explanatory of its real bearing and object. And since, for the purpose of giving a greater unity to the present discussion, as well as with a view to a more forcible exhibition of its salient features, we find it more convenient, in our consideration of the two branches which compose the subjects of this inquiry, to reverse the or-

der of their declaration in President Monroe's Message of 1823, we shall first direct our attention to an historical review of the circumstances which determined the latter, and which, at the present day, throw the clearest light upon its origin and purport.

It has been supposed by some, that the language of this declaration points to the establishment and existence on this hemisphere of monarchical institutions as being in themselves necessarily dangerous to the peace and security of a republic like the United States. But such a supposition is manifestly without foundation, in any fair interpretation of its terms, and is in palpable contradiction with the President's recognition of the "existing colonies and dependencies" of the European powers; since, if proximity to monarchy was what he deprecated, these would have fallen equally within the scope of his warning; and when we remember that Mr. Monroe officially recognized the establishment of the Imperial government of Don Pedro in Brazil, and of Iturbide in Mexico, with the same promptitude that he had manifested in opening diplomatic relations with the South American republics, it becomes difficult to reconcile such conduct on his part with these imputed apprehensions of a mere form of government as being dangerous to our own because existing on the same continent with it.

A closer scrutiny of the successive declarations of President Monroe with reference to the Spanish American States, as found in his Messages of 1823 and 1824, will make it apparent that he protested, not against despotical institutions in themselves considered, but against their forcible extension by the Allied Powers of Europe to any portion of this hemisphere. *This* he pronounced "dangerous to our peace and happiness," and that his apprehensions of an interference on their part in the internal affairs of the Spanish colonies was the motive of this declaration is equally in consonance with the facts of contemporaneous history. What those facts were will therefore claim our attention, that by their light we may still more clearly elucidate the true meaning of President Monroe's language.

The Holy Alliance, of which the foundations were laid in

the treaty of Chaumont, and whose principles were ascertained and matured in the Congress of Vienna, and especially by the treaty concluded at Paris in September, 1815, between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, though ostensibly having France for the chief and primary object of its surveillance, early arrogated to itself the prerogative of determining what institutions and mode of government should be possessed by all the nations of the Continent. The principles of this alliance, as first constituted, were shared by the British government, which yet could not become a formal party in it, on account of that fundamental doctrine of the British constitution which restrained the Prince Regent from giving his autograph signature to the Alliance, (as did the other European sovereigns,) without the intervention of a responsible minister. When, however, this league adopted, as the bond of its union and the motive of its activity, the doctrines of "legitimacy" and of the "divine right of kings," and when, in pursuance of these principles, the Allies proceeded to claim the right of forcibly interfering in the domestic concerns of the European Continent, the British government recoiled from any active complicity in measures so contrary to the genius and history of British institutions since the Revolution of 1688.

At the congress of the European sovereigns held at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, which had among its principal objects a consideration of the relations between Spain and her revolted colonies in America, the British government, Lord Castlereagh being at the head of Foreign Affairs, tendered to Spain its *mediation*, but repudiated the plan of a joint *intervention by force* on the part of the Allies, as a means for the accomplishment of the end desired alike by Spain and the Holy Alliance, to wit, the restoration of the colonies to the allegiance they owed to the mother country. That some such purpose, however, was rather postponed than renounced by France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, became sufficiently apparent by the principles they subsequently promulgated at the congresses of Troppau, Laybach, and Verona, of which the two former were held for the purpose of ratifying the suppression of popular risings in Naples and Piedmont, while the latter took into consideration the internal condition of the

Spanish peninsula, then under the government of a constitutional Cortes, and no longer subject to the arbitrary will of its "lawful sovereign, King Ferdinand." In their circular despatch, dated at Laybach, May 12th, 1821, the Allies distinctly declared that they regarded "as equally null and disallowed by the public law of Europe, all pretended reform effected by revolt and open force." In the Congress of Verona it was determined by France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to suspend diplomatic intercourse with Spain during the regency of the Cortes, and in their circular letter, dated December 5th, 1822, the allied monarchs declared to the world "their resolution to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place, or under whatever form, it might show itself"; thus substantially repeating their claim made at Troppau,—"that the European powers have an undoubted right to take a hostile attitude in regard to those states in which the overthrow of the government might operate as an example." The subsequent action of the Continental sovereigns proved but too clearly that their hatred of "reform" did not limit itself to "reform effected by revolt and open force"; for when the king of Wurtemberg voluntarily granted his subjects a constitution, they suspended further intercourse with him, and withdrew their ministers from Stutgard.

With principles so arbitrary the British people and government could naturally have little sympathy; and accordingly the British plenipotentiary at Verona, the Duke of Wellington, refused to join in the measures concerted by the Holy Alliance for the reduction of Spain to the "unfettered rule" of Ferdinand. It was determined by the Allies at this conference to consign to France the duty of restoring order in Spain, with the promise on the part of Austria, Russia, and Prussia to make common cause with her if it were needed. In compliance with this arrangement, a French army, which had for some time been stationed on the Spanish borders under the guise of a *cordon sanitaire*, crossed the Pyrenees, in the spring of 1823, under the command of the Duc d'Angoulême, for the purpose of carrying into execution the decrees of the Congress of Verona, by reinstating Ferdinand on the throne of his fathers, and thereby re-asserting the indefeasibility of

hereditary right. Great Britain remained a passive spectator of this iniquitous invasion of the Peninsula, as before of the wrongs inflicted on Italy. Mr. Canning, however, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a despatch of the 31st of March, 1823, to Sir Charles Stuart, the British Ambassador at the Court of France, announced that, "with respect to the Spanish American provinces which had thrown off their allegiance to the crown of Spain, time and the course of events appeared substantially to have decided their separation from the mother country"; and further intimated, that the government of Great Britain would not permit the employment of any foreign force for their re-subjugation. The silence of the French court was construed into an acquiescence in these propositions, when, as the invasion of the Duc d'Angoulême drew nearer and nearer to a successful termination, it began to transpire more and more distinctly, that the French government would, at the close of the campaign in the Peninsula, direct its attention to the Spanish American colonies. England, which had protested at Laybach and remonstrated at Verona, only to see, as Mr. Canning afterwards said, her protest treated as waste paper and her remonstrances mingled with the air, now determined to adopt a more decided and peremptory style of address. Her commercial interests as well as her political principles were deeply involved in any measures tending to increase the complications of Spain with "the Indies," as her provinces were called. Indeed, not only the larger part of the external commerce of those countries, but even the internal operations of mining and agriculture, were carried on in a great degree by British enterprise and skill. With such interests at stake in the existing condition of the Spanish American states, the English government saw in the clearer light the iniquity of any designs on the part of the Holy Alliance, or of any of its members, against the internal polity of the nascent republics in the New World.

It was at this juncture that Mr. Canning "sounded" Mr. Rush, the Ambassador of the United States at the Court of St. James, upon the questions at issue with regard to the Spanish colonies, and in a conversation held on the 16th of

August, 1823, inquired of him "whether the government of the United States would go hand in hand with England" in resisting any combined attempt directed to their re-subjugation. This conversation led to subsequent conferences, and to the exchange of confidential notes on the same subject, of which the result was an offer on the part of Mr. Rush to join with Mr. Canning in a protest, in the name of the United States and Great Britain, against any interference on the part of other powers in the controversy between Spain and her revolted colonies, provided the British government would place itself side by side with the United States by at once acknowledging the independence of the Spanish American republics. In a note to Mr. Rush under date of August 20th, 1823, Mr. Canning had said,—1. That England conceived the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless; 2. That the question of their recognition as independent states was one of time and circumstances; 3. That England was not disposed, however, to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and the mother country, by amicable negotiation; 4. That she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colonies for herself; and 5. That she could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any other power with indifference.

Only three days later Mr. Canning informed Mr. Rush that the English government had received authentic information, that, as soon as France had achieved her object in Spain, a proposal would be made for a European congress, to consult specifically on Spanish America. Copies of both these notes were immediately transmitted by Mr. Rush to the government of the United States. To Mr. Canning Mr. Rush replied as at first, urging upon the British government the acknowledgment of Spanish American independence as a condition to the promulgation of a joint protest, to be assented to on his own responsibility, though in the name of the United States, against the "ambitious designs of the European powers." As Mr. Canning still recoiled from this final step, alleging as his reason for such caution the unsettled policy of the Spanish American states in the administration of their own internal affairs, Mr. Rush declined to join with

the English Minister in any counter-declarations against the schemes of France and her partners in the Holy Alliance. But though no such joint movement was made by Mr. Rush in conjunction with the English Secretary for the purpose of warding off the threatened intervention in Spanish America, yet it cannot be doubted, as Mr. Rush himself suggests, that, by the early transmission to our government of the intelligence communicated by Mr. Canning respecting the designs of the Allies on the Spanish American republics, the Cabinet at Washington was definitely advised of the projects contemplated by the sovereigns of Europe; and it was in the prospect or possibility of an armed intervention in the independent states of this continent that President Monroe, in his Message of 1823, declared to the world that "we should consider any attempt on their part [i. e. of the Allied Powers] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," and that, though they had "thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to interpose by force in the internal concerns of Spain," yet with respect to the Spanish American republics "we could not view any interposition, for the purpose of oppressing or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States," since, as the President argues, "it is impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent [in America] without endangering *our* peace and happiness."

We have now arrived at the point in our historical review from which we can clearly perceive at what this declaration of Mr. Monroe was aimed. It was intended as a caveat to the designs of the Allies, and as an earnest protest against the extension to this continent of the "political system" on which they were based. What were those designs, and what was this political system, which endangered the peace and safety of the United States? The history of the Holy Alliance furnishes a sufficient answer to both of these questions. The designs of the European monarchs against the independence of the Spanish American states, prosecuted as

they would be in accordance with a political system which recognized only the doctrine of legitimacy and the divine right of kings, would necessarily menace the very existence of our own institutions, since these had been founded in a most contumacious disregard of the principles deemed most "holy" by an alliance which arrogated to itself the "undoubted right to take a hostile attitude in regard to those states in which the overthrow of the government may operate as an example." In what country did the overthrow of legitimacy then exert so potent an influence as in the United States? And if the Spanish American republics were now to be assailed for their imitation of our "example," could we hope, as the federal representatives of the free principles most obnoxious to the Holy Alliance, that we should escape their flaming zeal in the cause of "order and legitimacy," after they had finished with the South American republics? A blow aimed at them *because* they were republics was a blow equally aimed at the independence of our own country; and hence it was that Mr. Monroe declared, that any such armed intervention by the Allied Powers of Europe could not be regarded as "in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States," — a declaration characterized no less by the calmness of its delivery, than by the patriotic foresight in which it was devised. Originated for the purpose of meeting a particular conjuncture of events, it finds in them alone its real purport and its justification. Wise and seasonable with reference to the circumstances of the time at which it was promulgated, it ceased to be of any force, even as a presidential recommendation, so soon as the crisis which called it forth had passed.

To those who remember the state of public feeling in this country during the summer and autumn of 1823, we shall seem to assert nothing improbable when we venture to express the opinion, that Mr. Monroe would have deemed it his duty to direct the attention of Congress to the probable ulterior designs of the Holy Alliance, even apart from the authentic intelligence which he received through our able Minister at the English Court. The domination extended over Italy, the intimidation of Switzerland, whose press had

been placed under Austrian surveillance and censorship, and the invasion of Spain because she chose to be governed by a constitutional assembly, afforded a sufficient proof that the war of the Allies was, as Mr. Brougham said in the House of Commons in February, 1823, "not against freedom on the Ebro, or freedom on the Mincio, but against *freedom*, — against freedom wherever it is found, — freedom by whomsoever enjoyed, — freedom by whatever means achieved, by whatever institutions secured." Moreover, it was known that, before the Duc d'Angoulême had made his descent on Spain, M. de Châteaubriand, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had tendered "a specific offer of succor" to the Spanish government in the protracted controversy with its revolted colonies. In view of these facts, we may readily infer that inquiring minds among our own countrymen early descried the dangers portended by principles so contrary to the genius of our own institutions. A writer in the *North American Review* for October, 1823, two months before the declaration of President Monroe was given to the world, held the following language upon the signs of the times as indicated in the European politics of that period: "The nature of the contest is such as almost necessarily to involve us in disputes with one or the other of the great contracting parties. If success should favor the allied monarchs, would they be satisfied with reforming the government of Spain? Would not the Spanish colonies, as part of the same empire, then demand their parental attention? And might not the United States be next considered as deserving their kind guardianship?"

That the warnings thus uttered with regard to the South American republics and Mexico were not chimerical, and that the declaration of Mr. Monroe was conceived to meet a *question brulante*, and no mere figment of the heated brain, was sufficiently evinced by the immediate progress of events. Only three weeks after the opening of Congress in 1823, and before, as yet, the message of Mr. Monroe had reached the shores of Europe, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Conde de Ofalia, addressed a circular letter to the courts of Paris, St. Petersburg, and Vienna, inviting, in the name

of his "august master," King Ferdinand, "the cabinets of his Majesty's dear and intimate allies to establish a conference at Paris, to the end that their plenipotentiaries, assembled there along with those of his Catholic Majesty, may aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted countries of America," for which "desired co-operation" it was very significantly intimated that late events in the Peninsula "had paved the way." Great Britain was invited to participate in the deliberations of this new congress, which, however, she declined to do, in terms that indicated the most unequivocal opposition to the measures which it was intended to take into consideration.

At this juncture of events, and just before the annual opening of the English Parliament, the message of President Monroe arrived in Europe, and, by its well-weighed and explicit language on Spanish American affairs, coupled with the refusal of England to take part in the proposed congress, "effectually put an end to the project of assembling one similar to those which had met at Vienna, Aix-la-Chapelle, Laybach, and Verona." Such, at least, is the testimony of Mr. Stapleton in his "Political Life of the Right Honorable George Canning." Mr. Brougham, in his Address on the King's Speech at the opening of the Parliamentary session on February 3d, 1824, spoke of the arrival in Europe of President Monroe's Message as an event by which "the question with regard to South America, he believed, was disposed of, or nearly so, and than which no event had ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude over all the freemen of Europe." And at a later day in the same session, on the 18th of March, Lord John Russell contrasted its "decided language" with the fluctuating policy of the British ministry as represented at Verona, and uttered his lamentation over the humiliation of England, thus doomed to witness the forfeiture of the "commanding station" assigned to her by Addison in the lines "whose sense" his lordship had the good taste to pronounce "better than their poetry";—

"'T is Britain's care to watch o'er Europe's fate,
And hold in balance each contending state,
To threaten bold, presumptuous kings with war,
And answer each afflicted neighbor's prayer."

Such was the reception which the President's Message met in the English Parliament. Let us now examine what disposition was made of its suggestions on Spanish American affairs by the Congress of our own country.

On the 20th of January, 1824, Mr. Clay, who was Speaker of the House of Representatives, moved the following resolution in Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union:—

“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible interposition, by the Allied Powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States.”

We need not state what was the fate of this resolution, as well as of a similar one offered by Mr. Poinsett of South Carolina. Its object, as appears from the face of it, was to give a legislative sanction to the principles enunciated in the President's Message; but, whether from prudent caution or timid counsels (as to which we venture to express no opinion), it was never adopted by the House of Representatives. As John Randolph of Roanoke sarcastically remarked, in commenting on the resolution only two years afterwards, “It was never even called up,—it slept,—it took a dose of Turkey opium,—a dose from the Levant, brought in a Greek ship,—it fell sound asleep, and has not waked up from that day to this.” Mr. Randolph's satirical allusions to “Turkey opium” and “Greek ships” will be better understood by the reader who remembers that Mr. Poinsett's resolution embodied with that of Mr. Clay in behalf of the Spanish American states an expression of “deep interest in the heroic struggle of the Greeks,” which at that time engaged the sympathies of the American people.

The “Monroe Doctrine,” then, so far as it related to Spanish America, failed to meet the approval of Congress. Nor will it suffice to allege in explanation of this apathy, that the crisis had passed; for, at the time of the presentation of Mr. Clay's resolution, the courts of St. Petersburg, Vienna,

Berlin, and Paris had signified to Spain their readiness to meet her in conference at Paris "on the fate of her American dominions." Such a conference, it is known, was informally held, though the result of its deliberations has never transpired, save that the allies represented in it encouraged Ferdinand to make no composition with his revolted subjects in the New World. It is a remarkable fact, that while there was a perfect unanimity of sentiment and purpose in the English Parliament in favor of making a *casus belli* of any interposition by foreign powers in the struggle between Spain and her late colonies, there were not wanting those in our own Congress who refused to make of that contingency a belligerent issue; and it was in this same spirit that Mr. Woodbury of New Hampshire, two years after the promulgation of Mr. Monroe's declaration, "denounced" the principle (we quote from the record), "that Spain has not, by such alliances as national law warrants, and as were formed on both sides in our own Revolution, any right to attempt to reconquer and recolonize South America."

While, therefore, the "Monroe Doctrine" with regard to "forcible intervention" was still a living question, it failed to meet the sanction of Congress, in whose judgment it seemed at least prudent to delay the adoption of any measures corroborative of the President's suggestions, until such intervention had actually taken place. The declaration of the President did not commit the policy of the country to any specific action in the premises. It rested with Congress to give it life and activity, and this Congress declined to do. Upon the wisdom of this decision we do not undertake to pronounce; we merely state the facts, for the purpose of drawing the conclusion that this branch of the "Monroe Doctrine" is not a living and substantive principle of our governmental policy. In case, however, of any emergency similar to that which prompted the declaration of Mr. Monroe, it would be competent for Congress to resuscitate and enforce the principle he announced, not because it was the "doctrine" of *Mr. Monroe*, but because it might be deemed wise and expedient *at the time*. Let the dead past bury its dead. To act in the living present, is as sound a maxim in public affairs as in private life.

We now proceed to an examination into the origin and intention of the other declaration of the President in his Annual Message of 1823, that upon which the advocates of the "Monroe Doctrine," as now popularly taught among us, place their chief reliance in vindicating its claim to be considered "a great and eternal principle of American policy." We allude to the "principle" that "the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." As, in order to explain the origin and purpose of the declaration already considered, we recurred to the facts of contemporaneous history, so in our analysis of that which still remains for discussion we shall rely entirely upon the documentary evidence contained in the annals of Congress. We shall undertake to show that this declaration, though made in a different manner, and in connection with a different matter, (that is, as an incident of our controversy with Russia concerning the territories respectively claimed by the two governments in the Northwest,) yet grew out of the same state of things as that which justified in Mr. Monroe's estimation his declaration with regard to forcible intervention. We shall also endeavor to prove that this doctrine of non-colonization has been greatly misconceived, and therefore perverted from its original meaning, and, lastly, that even in its authentic form it has been, not only tacitly rejected, but expressly repudiated by the action of Congress.

First, as to the origin of this declaration, it is a well-known fact in our political history, that its paternity is to be ascribed to John Quincy Adams. The truth of this rests upon something stronger than oral testimony or common belief; the principle is found clearly enunciated in the state papers of that eminent man, several months before it was given to the world in the Message of Mr. Monroe. This will obviously appear from the following reference to our diplomatic history while Mr. Adams was Secretary of State under that President. We can afford to give only a rapid *aperçu* of the topics necessary to substantiate the statement that the declaration against colonization originated in the liberation of the Spanish American states; but the fact will be none the less clearly demonstrated.

As already intimated, a controversy was pending between

the United States and Russia in 1823, concerning their respective possessions in the northwestern part of America. By a ukase of the Emperor Alexander, dated 4th (16th) September, 1821, an exclusive territorial right on the Northwest Coast was asserted as belonging to Russia. Its alleged extent was from the northern extremity of the continent to latitude 51° . And by the third article of a convention between the United States and Great Britain, it had been agreed that the question of proprietary right in "any country that may be claimed by either party on the Northwest Coast of America, westward of the Stony Mountains," should be left in abeyance for the term of ten years from the date of the signature of said convention, "it being well understood," as the instrument adds, "that this agreement is not to be construed to the prejudice of any claim which either of the two high contracting parties may have to any part of the said country." The rights of the United States in this quarter, now known as Oregon Territory, were based on discovery, exploration, and also on the "treaty of amity, settlement, and limits" between the United States and Spain, of 22d February, 1819, by which we acquired all the rights of Spain north of the forty-second parallel of latitude; and our government contended that "Spain was the only European power who, prior to the discovery of the Columbia River [by Captain Gray] had *any* pretensions to territorial rights on the Northwest Coast of America." Thus trebly fortified in their claims, the United States regarded their rights in that region as superior to those of Great Britain, while both governments alike united in resisting the pretensions advanced by the imperial ukase of 1821. It was in this complicated state of the controversy that Mr. Adams, the Secretary of State, under date of July 2, 1823, four months before the publication of President Monroe's Message, wrote as follows to Mr. Rush, the Ambassador of the United States, as before stated, at the Court of London:—

"The discussion of the Russian pretensions in the negotiations now proposed, necessarily involves the interests of the three powers, and renders it manifestly proper that the United States and Great Britain should come to a mutual understanding with respect to *their* respective pretensions, as well as upon their joint views with reference to those of

Russia. Copies of the instructions to Mr. Middleton [Ambassador of the United States at the Russian Court] are, therefore, herewith transmitted to you ; and the President wishes you to confer freely with the British government on the subject.

"The principles settled by the Nootka Sound Convention [between Spain and Great Britain] of 28th October, 1790; were :—

"1st. That the rights of fishing in the South Seas, of trading with the natives of the Northwest Coast of America, and of making settlements on the coast itself, for the purpose of that trade, north of the *actual* settlements of Spain, were common to all the European nations, and, of course, to the United States.

"2d. That, so far as the actual settlements of Spain had extended, she possessed the exclusive right, territorial, and of navigation and fishery ; extending to the distance of ten miles from the coasts so *actually* occupied.

"3d. That on the coasts of *South America*, and the adjacent islands, *south* of the parts already occupied by Spain, no settlement shall thereafter be made either by British or Spanish subjects ; but on both sides should be retained the liberty of landing and of erecting temporary buildings for the purposes of the fishery. These rights were, also, of course, enjoyed by the people of the United States.

"The exclusive rights of Spain to any portion of the American continents have ceased. That portion of the convention [the Nootka Sound Convention], therefore, which recognizes the exclusive colonial rights of Spain on these continents, though confirmed, as between Great Britain and Spain, by the first additional article to the treaty of the 5th of July, 1814, has been extinguished by the fact of the independence of the South American nations and of Mexico. These independent nations will possess the rights incident to that condition, and their territories will of course be subject to no *exclusive* right of navigation in their vicinity, or of access to them by any foreign nation. *A necessary consequence OF THIS STATE OF THINGS will be, that the American continents henceforth will no longer be subject to COLONIZATION. Occupied by civilized nations, they will be accessible to Europeans and each other on that footing alone ;* and the Pacific Ocean, in every part of it, will remain open to the navigation of all nations, in like manner with the Atlantic.

"Incidental to the condition of national independence and sovereignty, the rights of interior navigation of their rivers will belong to each of the American nations within its own territories.

"The application of colonial principles of exclusion, therefore, cannot be admitted by the United States as lawful, upon any part of the

Northwest Coast of America, or as belonging to any European nation."

This extract from the despatch of Mr. Adams contains, as will be seen, not only the germ of Mr. Monroe's declaration on this point, but the rationale of the argument by which that declaration was to be sustained. It was asserted that Spain had been ousted from all her possessions in the continents of the New World;—in North America, by her treaty with the United States, and by successful revolution in Mexico; in South America, by the liberation of her late colonies from the yoke of the mother country. And as by Spain's express renunciation of all her rights, of whatever kind, above the forty-second degree of north latitude, (according to the terms of the treaty of 22d February, 1819,) the United States succeeded to all her possessions north of that parallel, so would the new Spanish American states, in the language of Mr. Rush, as dictated by Mr. Adams and urged upon the attention of the British negotiators by the American Minister, "now possess the rights incident to their condition of political independence, and would henceforth necessarily preclude other nations from forming colonial establishments upon any part of the American continents."

The reader, on comparing the declaration of Mr. Monroe with the principle asserted by Mr. Adams in his correspondence with Mr. Rush, will find that they are closely similar in meaning, and expressed in nearly identical terms. And he will further observe, that this declaration also has its origin in the "same state of things" which justified the protest against foreign intervention, to wit, the successful revolution of the Spanish American states, or, as Mr. Monroe phrases it, "the free and independent condition which they [the American continents] have assumed and maintained," by which he can be understood to allude only to the enfranchisement from colonial vassalage of the late Spanish dependencies.

As early as September 18, 1823, and therefore before the promulgation of the President's declaration, Mr. Rush, in a conference with Mr. Canning on Spanish American affairs with primary reference to the threatened intervention of the Holy Alliance, had thrown out, as he informs us, the pregnant

hint suggested by Mr. Adams's despatch, "that it would soon be seen by Britain that the United States, in their proposals for adjusting with Russia, and with Britain, the respective pretensions of the three powers on the coast of the Pacific, were forced to take for granted the independence of all the late colonies of Spain on that continent, as the inevitable basis of all just and practical negotiation. Their independence was, in fine, the new political element of modern times, and must henceforth pervade the political arrangements of both worlds." The annual Message of Mr. Monroe, in 1823, published to the world the principle thus enunciated and defended by Mr. Adams in his correspondence with Mr. Rush, and, as is to be presumed, with the American Minister at St. Petersburg, Mr. Middleton. The declaration, as Mr. Rush informs us, was not "expected" in England, nor was it "acquiesced in" by the British government, as we shall have occasion to remark in the sequel.

Having thus traced the origin of this declaration, we proceed to inquire into its actual meaning and application. The truth on these points, fortunately for our purpose, does not lie at the bottom of a well; it is found at our feet, though, from a strange mystification, the result either of a *crassa negligentia* or a *crassa ignorantia* still more remarkable, the authentic interpretation of this declaration, as subsequently given by its real author, Mr. Adams himself, has been almost universally overlooked or ignored by American statesmen in their harangues on the "Monroe Doctrine." In the celebrated debate which arose in both houses of Congress on the "Panama Mission," both branches of the "Monroe Doctrine" were passed in review, and that which we are now more particularly considering was officially expounded by Mr. Adams, who then filled the presidential chair, and was called upon to explain and enforce, as President, a principle which he had only three years before conceived as Secretary of State. His authority to speak *ex cathedra* on this point cannot, therefore, be disputed. It may first, however, be necessary for us to show distinctly how the "doctrine" came to be a subject of executive consideration, as well as of discussion by both houses of Congress, in the spring of 1826, less than three years after its promulgation by Mr. Monroe.

The "Panama Congress" of Spanish American republics, as is well known, had for its principal object the formation of a sort of compact or league, "by which the several states therein represented might more successfully defend themselves as well against Spain as against any other European power who should assist Spain in her hostile designs upon the welfare of the new states." All measures subsidiary to this general object would naturally be taken into consideration by such a council. The United States were invited to participate in the proceedings of this Congress, and among the "subsidiary measures" specifically adduced by the Spanish American republics, as falling within the scope of its deliberations, the following was announced in the official gazette of Colombia: "To take into consideration the means of making effectual the declaration of the President of the United States respecting any ulterior design of a foreign power to colonize any portion of this continent, and also the means of resisting all interference from abroad with the domestic concerns of the American governments." The accredited representatives at Washington of Mexico, Central America, and Colombia, in their official notes to Mr. Clay, then Secretary of State, in inviting the United States to participate in the proposed Congress at Panama, announced the same subjects as "points of great interest" which would naturally present themselves for discussion by said Congress. This question of non-colonization was therefore expressly brought to the notice of our government, and since the administration favored the proposition that the United States should be represented by ministers at Panama, it became necessary for Mr. Adams, in his recommendations to that effect, to explain to Congress the specific nature and extent of the principle embodied in this doctrine of non-colonization. Accordingly, in his special Message to the Senate, under date of December 26, 1825, advising the appointment "of Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary to the Assembly of American nations at Panama," Mr. Adams took occasion to explain the principle enunciated by the late President, in the following explicit and unmistakable terms. We quote from the Message:—

“An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, THAT EACH WILL GUARD, BY ITS OWN MEANS, against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders, may be found advisable. THIS WAS, MORE THAN TWO YEARS SINCE, ANNOUNCED BY MY PREDECESSOR TO THE WORLD as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents. It may be so developed to the new Southern nations that they will all feel it as an essential appendage to their independence.”

Such is the Monroe Doctrine with regard to colonization, as expounded and defined by him who was its originator. This extent it has, and nothing more,—that the American nations should “each guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders.” If this seem a lame and impotent conclusion of the whole matter, the fault resides not in the doctrine as conceived by Mr. Adams, and promulged by Mr. Monroe, but in the unwarranted assumptions of those who have since engrafted upon its stock purposes and objects wholly alien to its original nature. As with regard to the first declaration examined in this paper, so in our present review we purpose to confine ourselves to a narrative of facts; and if these do not coincide with the preconceived views of any reader, it will be, perhaps, because the facts themselves do not accord with his political philosophy, in which case, however, he can still take to himself the consolation of the witty French historian, and say, “So much the worse for the facts!”

We might well be satisfied to leave the exposition of this branch of the “Monroe Doctrine” to be determined by the single official statement of Mr. Adams. There is, however, cumulative evidence to the same effect which we may be pardoned in adducing. In his Message to the House of Representatives (dated March 26, 1826), in compliance with a resolution of inquiry as to “the correspondence between the government of the United States and the new states of America, or their ministers, respecting the proposed Congress or meeting of diplomatic agents at Panama,” the President unfolded his views on this principle of non-colonization at still greater length. He wrote as follows:—

“The late President of the United States, in his Message to Con-

gress of the 2d of December, 1823, while announcing the negotiation then pending with Russia, relating to the Northwest Coast of this continent, observed, that the occasion of the discussions to which that incident had given rise had been taken for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States were involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they had assumed and maintained, were thenceforward not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power. The principle had first been assumed in that negotiation with Russia. It rested upon a course of reasoning equally simple and conclusive. With the exception of the existing European colonies, which it was in no wise intended to disturb, the two continents consisted of several sovereign and independent nations, whose territories covered their whole surface. By this, their independent condition, the United States enjoyed the right of commercial intercourse with every part of their possessions. To attempt the establishment of a colony in those possessions, would be to usurp, to the exclusion of others, a commercial intercourse which was the common possession of all. It could not be done without encroaching upon existing rights of the United States. The government of Russia has never disputed these positions, nor manifested the slightest dissatisfaction at their having been taken. Most of the new American republics have declared their entire assent to them, and they now propose, among the subjects of consultation at Panama, to take into consideration the means of making effectual the assertion of that principle, as well as the means of resisting interference from abroad with the domestic concerns of the American governments.

“In alluding to these means, it would obviously be premature at this time to anticipate that which is offered merely as matter for consultation, or to pronounce upon those measures which have been or may be suggested. The purpose of this government is to concur in none which would import hostility to Europe, or justly excite resentment in any of her states. Should it be deemed advisable to contract any conventional engagement on this topic, *our views would extend no farther than to a mutual pledge of the parties to the compact, each to maintain the principle in application to its own territory, and to permit no colonial lodgement or establishment of European jurisdiction upon its own soil ;* and with respect to obtrusive interference from abroad, if its future character may be inferred from that which has been, and perhaps still is, exercised in more than one of the new states, a joint declaration of its character, and exposure of it to the world, may be probably all that the occasion would require. Whether the United States should or

should not be parties to such a declaration, may justly form a part of the deliberation."

To the same purport, and as more distinctly specifying the grounds on which it was asserted, that the commercial interests of the United States were implicated in this doctrine of anti-colonization, we may quote the following excerpt from Mr. Webster's speech on the "Panama Mission":—

"We have a general interest, that, through all the vast territories rescued from the dominion of Spain, our commerce may find its way, protected by treaties *with governments existing on the spot*. These views, and others of a similar character, render it highly desirable to us that these new states *should settle it as a part of their policy not to allow colonization within their respective territories*. True, indeed, we *did not need their aid to assist us in maintaining such a course for ourselves*; but we had an interest in their assertion and support of the principle as applicable to their own territories."

To these we may also add the following official exposition of the "Monroe Doctrine" by Henry Clay, while he was Secretary of State under Mr. Adams, as being important for the light it sheds upon the character of the colonization against which the United States protested by the declaration in question. We quote from his despatch, dated March 25, 1825, to Mr. Poinsett, our Minister to Mexico.

"You will bring to the notice of the Mexican government the Message of the late President of the United States to their Congress, on the 2d of December, 1823, asserting certain important principles of inter-continental law in the relations of Europe and America. The first principle asserted in that Message is, that the American continents are not henceforth to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power. In the maintenance of that principle all the independent governments of America have an interest, *but that of the United States has probably the least*. Whatever foundation may have existed three centuries ago, or even at a later period, when all this continent was under European subjection, for the establishment of a rule, founded on priority of discovery and occupation, for apportioning among the powers of Europe parts of this continent, none can be now admitted as applicable to its present condition. There is no disposition to disturb the colonial possessions, as they may now exist, of any of the European powers; but it is against the establishment of new European

colonies upon this continent that the principle is directed. The countries in which any such new establishments might be attempted are now open to the enterprise and commerce of all Americans. And the justice or propriety cannot be recognized of arbitrarily limiting and circumscribing that enterprise and commerce by the act of voluntarily planting a new colony, without the consent of America, under the auspices of foreign powers belonging to another and a distant continent. Europe would be indignant at any attempt to plant a colony on any part of her shores, and her justice must perceive in the rule contended for only perfect reciprocity."

From this reasoning of the distinguished Secretary, it will be seen that the inhibition of future colonization on the American continents was intended to apply only to the establishment of colonies "founded on priority of discovery and occupation," in accordance with the custom which had obtained among European powers, while as yet the New World was an unclaimed wilderness, and when the whole continent was under European subjection. This state of things, it is argued, no longer exists. European domination has been extinguished in America, except with respect to existing colonies and dependencies, and the independent states now possess a right of eminent domain over the unoccupied soil of their territories, which estops any other nation from voluntarily planting a colony within their limits, as though the continent was still without metes and boundaries, and not covered by national jurisdictions. To colonization by purchase, treaty, or lawful conquest, the Monroe declaration was not intended to apply, however it may have come to be considered in these latter days.* That the nature of the

* While we are quoting from this state paper of Mr. Clay's, it may not be inappropriate to append his official explanation of the declaration which engaged our attention in the earlier part of this inquiry. We extract from the same despatch as follows: — "The other principle asserted in the Message [of Mr. Monroe] is, that, whilst we do not desire to interfere in Europe with the political system of the Allied Powers, we should regard as dangerous to our peace and safety any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere. The political systems of the two continents are essentially different. Each has an exclusive right to judge for itself what is best suited to its own condition, and most likely to promote its happiness; *but neither has a right to enforce upon the other the establishment of its peculiar system.* THIS PRINCIPLE was declared, in the face of

colonization interdicted was such as we have described, is still further proved by the negotiations carried on by Mr. Rush in pursuance of the policy indicated in the despatch of Mr. Adams (before quoted), as well as of President Monroe's declaration. He informs us that the British plenipotentiaries, in "totally denying" the principle thus propounded by the government of the United States, took occasion to say "that Great Britain considered the whole of the unoccupied parts of America as being open to her future settlements *in like manner as heretofore*"; that is, by "priority of discovery and occupation."

We have thus presented an array of evidence in elucidation of this declaration, sufficient, we trust, to convince the most sceptical, that its original object was not that which is now assigned to it in political parlance and popular acceptance. To suppose that this declaration was intended as a promise, pledge, or engagement, that the United States would guard from European encroachment the territory of the "whole boundless continent," is greatly to misconceive the purpose of its promulgator, and to misconstrue the explicit interpretation published to the world by its author. Yet if this interpretation had been couched in the most ambiguous terms, it could hardly have been more misunderstood than it would seem to be at the present day; or if it had been delivered in the cuneiform characters of unearthed Nineveh, it could hardly have remained more generally unknown, we will not say among the "reading public," but even, if we may judge from the tenor of Congressional speeches on this topic, among American statesmen of high position and long experience in public affairs. In therefore exhuming these documents from the dust which neglect has suffered to

the world, at a moment when there was reason to apprehend that the Allied Powers were entertaining designs inimical to the freedom, if not independence, of the new governments. There is ground for believing that the declaration of it had considerable effect in preventing the maturity, if not in producing the abandonment, of all such designs. Both principles were laid down after much and anxious deliberation on the part of the late administration. The PRESIDENT, *who then formed a part of it, continues entirely to coincide in both*. And you will urge upon the government of Mexico the utility and expediency of asserting the same principle on all proper occasions."

settle upon them, we may venture to claim, in the phrase of the day, to have "vindicated the truth of history."

The politicians of the present time who construe the Monroe Doctrine into a pledge, on the part of the United States, to prevent any future colonization by European powers on the American continent, fall into precisely the same error as did the South American republics in 1826. They saw, or fancied they saw, in the declarations of President Monroe at once the club of Hercules and the shield of Telamon, — the former to ward off the armed intervention of the Holy Alliance, and the latter to protect their territory from colonial encroachment. It was on purpose to disabuse their minds of any such misconceptions, that Mr. Adams so distinctly explained the character and application of the principle declared by Mr. Monroe. That these republics were disappointed in their hopes can be readily imagined. And hence we find Mr. Everett, in his speech on the "Panama Congress," expressing himself as follows : —

"The Southern republics have not invited us, in general terms, to contract an offensive and defensive alliance with them. It is true, that on two particular points, of which the original suggestion was understood by them to be made by this government, in the Message of December, 1823, the Colombian Minister has named an alliance as a subject of discussion. On neither side of these points, nor on any points, — as is stated in terms in the present Message to the Senate, — is it the intention of the Executive to propose an alliance. On one of these points, *the resistance to colonization, when the Southern republics shall become fully informed of the position of the United States in reference to that question, most assuredly they will withdraw the wish, if they now entertain it, to enter into an alliance with us.*"

Having shown, as we trust, to the satisfaction of all candid readers whose patience has carried them thus far in this discussion, that it was by no means the intention of Mr. Monroe to entail on the United States the responsibilities of a universal protectorate over the American continents, but that his declaration, when officially interpreted for the benefit as well of our own legislators as of the Spanish American republics, read as follows : "Take care of your possessions, as the United States will take care of theirs," — we

might be content at this point to waive the further consideration of the subject; for this latter view of the doctrine appears to us so just and reasonable, and, at the same time, so harmless as a measure of intra-continental policy, that we cannot bring ourselves to believe that it will be seriously contested by any, except, perhaps, by such amiable persons as believe it harmful to defend from foreign aggression the soil of their own country.

In order, however, to examine this declaration in all its bearings, it seems incumbent on us to consider it in the two separate aspects under which it may be contemplated, to wit, as a measure for our own adoption, and as a maxim to be recommended to the other states of the American continents. Let us ask, then, whether in either of these respects the Monroe declaration with regard to future colonization in America has been ratified and approved by the Congress of the United States, — the only way in which, according to our Constitution, “a fundamental policy of the government” can be established. The Statutes at Large, we imagine, will be searched in vain for any such enactment; for it would seem to be a work of supererogation for Congress to declare that the territory of the United States is not subject to colonization by any European power, and to declare this with regard to all the states of the continent would be to assume a jurisdiction over them, which those states have not conceded to us, and which, when they proposed to confer with us on the subject, we declined in any way to exercise. Our legislative enactments in the matter of the “Panama Congress” fully substantiate the truth of this latter assertion.

When the resolution “to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the President of the United States to send ministers to the Congress of Panama” was under discussion in the House of Representatives, it was expressly voted, that such ministers should in no way make any compact or engagement with the Spanish American states, in regard either to any threatened intervention or any future colonization by the European powers on the American continents. Resolutions to this effect were introduced by Mr. McLane of Delaware and Mr. Rives of Virginia, who afterwards, however, agreed

to accept a "modification" presented by Mr. Buchanan of Pennsylvania, embodying the substance of both their resolutions. This modification, after reciting and approving the neutral policy of the United States, declares:—

"It is therefore the opinion of this House, that the government of the United States ought not to be represented at the Congress of Panama except in a diplomatic character, nor ought they to form any alliance, offensive or defensive, or negotiate respecting such an alliance, with all or any of the South American republics; *nor ought they to become parties with them, or either of them, to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European powers with their independence or form of government, or to any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization upon the continents of America; but that the people of the United States should be left free to act, in any crisis, in such a manner as their feelings of friendship towards these republics and as their own honor and policy may at the time dictate.*"

This resolution was passed in the House by a vote of 99 yeas to 95 nays; and thus was the declaration with respect to colonization left in abeyance, or rather expressly repudiated, by this branch of Congress, with reference to the Spanish American states.

We have said that the Congressional enactment of the Monroe declaration on this topic, as afterwards explained by Mr. Adams, would appear to be a work of supererogation so far as it relates to, our own country. To declare that our own territory is not subject to colonization by any European power, would seem idle and nugatory. In truth it would be so at the present day, when our limits are clearly defined, and when there can no longer be any pretence for colonial settlements within our borders, or any probability that such settlements will ever be attempt'ed. But this was not the condition of our territory at the period when the Monroe Doctrine was first promulgated. The declaration of the President in his Message of 1823, with regard to future colonization, was made, it will be remembered, as an incident of the discussion respecting our northwestern territory. In fact, the principle was introduced by Mr. Adams in his correspondence with Mr. Rush, for the special purpose of protesting

in its name against certain colonial schemes in that quarter, supposed to be contemplated both by Great Britain and by Russia, which, if carried into operation, might lead to an occupancy of our own territory, and an infringement on our rights of eminent domain in the Northwest, as claimed by discovery, exploration, and treaty stipulations with Spain. Great Britain, we have already seen, refused to admit the principle as presented by Mr. Rush in compliance with Mr. Adams's instructions. Was the principle insisted on by the American negotiator? To this question the answer is furnished by Mr. Rush himself. We quote from his "Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London."

"January 6. In a despatch to the Secretary of State of this date, I mention Mr. Canning's desire that the negotiation at St. Petersburg on the Russian ukase of September, 1821, respecting the Northwest Coast, to which the United States and England had equally objected, should proceed separately, and not conjointly, by the three nations, as proposed by the United States, and my acquiescence in this course. It being a departure from the course my government had contemplated, I give the following reasons for it.

"1. That whatever force of argument I might be able to give to the principle of non-colonization as laid down in the President's Message, which had arrived in England since my instructions for the negotiation, my opinion was, that it would still remain a subject of contest between the United States and England; and that, as, by all I could learn since the Message arrived, Russia also dissented from the principle, a negotiation at St. Petersburg relative to the Northwest Coast, to which the three nations were parties, might place Russia on the side of England and against the United States. This I thought had better be avoided.

"2. That a preliminary and detached discussion of so great a principle, against which England protested *in limine*, brought on by me when her Foreign Secretary was content to waive the discussion at present, and preferred doing so, might have an unpropitious influence on other parts of the negotiation of more immediate and practical interest.

"3. That by abstaining from discussing it at present, nothing was given up. The principle, as promulgated in the President's Message, would remain undiminished, as notice to other nations, and a guide to me in the general negotiation with England when that came on."

The principle thus prudently postponed by Mr. Rush was unequivocally disallowed by the British plenipotentiaries when the "general negotiation" came on. Was it then insisted on by our government? If it was, we know not on what page of our diplomatic history or Congressional annals there is any evidence of the fact. But we do know that the administration of Mr. Polk, which was most strenuous in the assertion, if not in the maintenance, of the "Monroe Doctrine," and of which the supporters, or a majority of them at least, defended the claim of the United States in the northwest territory to be good and valid up to $54^{\circ} 40'$, was afterwards brought to accept a proposition of the British government, by which all the territory north of the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, claimed by our government from the time of Mr. Monroe to the day of Mr. Polk, was not only rendered "subject to future colonization by a European power," but was actually yielded to the government of Great Britain. We have no complaint to make against this adjustment of our difficulty with England in the Oregon controversy. It seemed to us at the time to be a wise and honorable arrangement, nor have we changed our opinion of it at the present day. But that it was in direct and palpable contravention of the "Monroe Doctrine," as held by that administration, and as applied to the defence of what was claimed to be our own territory, can be doubted by none. Are we not, therefore, justified in saying that this doctrine, even with regard to our own territorial claims, has not been uniformly observed and enforced by the action of our government?

The British government in its persistent denial of this principle was mainly influenced by the colonial settlements already planted and still projected by England on the Northwest Coast, or Oregon Territory; for it was as an estoppel of such pretensions and schemes on her part in that quarter that Mr. Adams installed the new doctrine in our diplomacy. That she did not protest against it with respect to the territories of the Spanish American states is evident from the despatch of Mr. Canning before alluded to, in which he had said, "That England could not see the transfer of any portion of them [the Spanish republics] to any other power with in-

difference." Our government, by its principle of non-colonization on the American continent, held the same language with respect to them, but its position differed from that of England in point of comprehension and generality. The scope of the maxim, as we applied it, extruded Great Britain from the Territory of Oregon to an extent greater than she was ready to concede. Hence the conflict between the two governments on this topic.

And here we may, in conclusion, be permitted to pay a tribute to the sagacity of Mr. Rives of Virginia, who, in the discussion on the Panama Mission, made particular allusion to this controversy between the United States and England in the matter of their respective possessions in Oregon. After a careful perusal of the whole debate on that subject, we venture to say, that, of all who opposed the recommendation of Mr. Adams with regard to the representation of the United States in that "Amphictyonic Council," this accomplished statesman was the only one who fairly met and contested the doctrine of non-colonization as expounded by the President. Some of the members in opposition to the administration satisfied themselves by scouting it as nugatory and absurd, while others professed to see in it a measure ostensibly innocuous, but really masking designs injurious to the traditional neutral policy of the country since the days of Washington. Mr. Rives, however, opposed the proposition because, as he feared, the deliberations at Panama might result in committing the policy of the United States to the forcible assertion of our extreme pretensions in Oregon. On this point he said:—

"So far as our *territorial claims* [in Oregon] are made the foundation of the principle advanced by our government, in relation to future colonization on this continent, we have seen that these *claims* are not only controverted by others, but the subject of serious doubt even among ourselves; and our minister in London [Mr. Rush] seemed to recognize the weight of the objections urged against them, when he told the British Plenipotentiaries that 'he had not before been aware of the character and extent of all these objections.' If the principle be attempted to be supported, upon any other ground [i. e. than the justice of our claims in Oregon], it is, in my opinion, *wholly unsustainable*, and is to be classed among those *inventions* of modern diplomacy, which are

to be defended, not by the *sword*, but by the *pen*. But, sir, if we were most thoroughly satisfied of the justice of this principle, why should we commit ourselves to its *support*, by any *compact* with our South American neighbors? We do not want *their aid* in defending our rights, and if we did, we should not obtain it by the compact proposed, as each party is to be pledged to maintain the principle *separately*, in application to its own territory. I trust, sir, I have shown to the satisfaction of the committee the danger and inexpediency of adopting the measure suggested by the President, upon the subject of colonization, and that they will not sanction the mission to Panama with reference to any such object." *

This argument of Mr. Rives, it will be seen, is intended to evince the impolicy of any declaration by way of pledge or compact that might bind the United States to enforce the principle of non-colonization throughout the whole region claimed by our government in the Territory of Oregon. If, he said, we assert that our title is good up to the fifty-first parallel of latitude, or even higher, and if at the same time we enter into agreements with the Spanish American states represented at Panama to maintain this principle of President Monroe, even as defined by Mr. Adams, we shall needlessly place ourselves under obligations to defend claims which the country, if left to pursue an uncommitted course, might deem it better to waive than to enforce with the sword. How well these positions were taken, we need not represent. The subsequent political and diplomatic history of the United States with reference to Oregon Territory fully justifies the caution which Mr. Rives then advocated in the assertion of our territorial claims upon this principle of opposition to future colonization; for the administration of Mr. Polk, though declaring our title to the "whole of Oregon" to be "clear and unquestionable," found it wise and expedient, in a spirit of compromise, and in a preference for the arts of peace which did it honor, to adjust our controversy with the English government by abating somewhat of the extreme pretensions with which we had entered into the negotiation.

Here, then, we dismiss the subject of our paper. Into the wisdom of the "Monroe Doctrine," as now popularly taught

* The *italics* of this excerpt are the speaker's.

and advocated in the high places of the land, it has formed no part of our present purpose to inquire. We have simply sought to show, that what is thus designated is not the doctrine of Mr. Monroe's Message of 1823, and that the principles now advocated in its name are wholly unhistorical, and without foundation in any legitimate interpretation of his guarded language. It therefore becomes unjust to the memory of that distinguished man to associate his honored name with principles which he never approved, and from which his cautious nature would have been among the first to shrink.

- ART. X. — 1. *Prize Essay on the Use and Abuse of Alcoholic Liquors, in Health and Disease.* By WM. B. CARPENTER, M. D., F. R. S. Philadelphia : Blanchard and Lea. 1853. 12mo. pp. 178.
2. *The Physiological Errors of Teetotalism.* Westminster Review, July, 1855.

WHETHER the doctrine of total abstinence from alcoholic drinks for persons in health is based upon the established facts and principles of physiology, is a question whose scientific interest is second only to its moral importance. It was decided in the affirmative by Dr. Carpenter ; and no physiologist appeared to raise any essential objection to his conclusions. A writer in the Westminster Review has, however, recently attempted to reverse his decision ; and thus the question is opened anew. Many also profess to agree with the reviewer ; and we therefore propose to examine his arguments,—this being the first and the sole professedly scientific and logical defence of the habitual use of alcohol, on physiological grounds, which has attracted our attention.

To use the words applied by the reviewer himself to Dr. Carpenter, " If we confine our polemics to statements advanced by him, we limit the sweep of argument, shorten the demand on the reader's patience, and avoid the necessity for the pitiable exposure of nonsense advanced by champions less